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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
EXXON CORPORATION; 
EXXONMOBIL CORPORATION; and 
MOBIL EXPLORATION & 
PRODUCTION, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 20081017-SC 
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE UINTAH BASIN REVITALIZATION 
FUND AND NAVAJO REVITALIZATION FUND IN SUPPORT OF 
RESPONDENT 
BASIS FOR PARTICIPATION BY AMICI CURIAE 
Amici Curiae Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund and Navajo Revitalization Fund 
have filed, concurrently with this Brief in Support of Respondent, a Motion for Leave to 
File an Amicus Brief and a Memorandum in Support of the Motion. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Amici Funds believe that the decision of this Court to prospectively apply it's 
holding in ExxonMobil Corp. v. Utah State Tax Common, 2003 UT 53, 86 P.3d 706 was 
correct. In this appeal Petitioners assert that such selectively prospective application of the 
holding was in error. Amici's position is that such an application not only was, but 
remains, appropriate and urge that the Court not change it course in this appeal. 
Status of this Issue: The issue of whether or not this Court erred in applying it's holding in 
ExxonMobil prospectively was not considered by the Commission but only raised by the 
Petitioner's in this appeal of the decision by the Commission to deny it's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund and the Navajo Revitalization Fund (the 
"Funds") are both "enterprise funds/' operating under the oversight of the Division of 
Housing and Community Development of the Utah Department of Community and 
Culture. They were created by the Utah Legislature in 1995 and 1996, respectively. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 9-10-101 to 108 and 9-11-101 to 108 (West 2004). For the purpose of 
demonstrating the vital interest of these two funds in the matters which are the subject of 
this appeal, a brief description of the circumstances which gave rise to the two funds and 
the way that they operate is necessary. 
History 
In 1994 protracted litigation concerning the jurisdictional status of land within the 
Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation in Northeastern Utah was in its final stages. With 
the principal jurisdictional issues having been judicially resolved, the State, the Ute Indian 
Tribe and the Counties of Duchesne and Uintah entered into negotiations in an effort to 
settle a number of outstanding issues, including hunting and fishing (wildlife 
conservation) rights; arrest authority (including the cross-deputization of law enforcement 
officers); questions of civil-regulatory authority; water rights; environmental regulation; 
the status of rights of way crossing tribal land; and a number of taxation issues. 
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One issue was particularly pressing and was dealt with at an early stage of the 
negotiations. The Tribal Business Committee of the Ute Indian Tribe had passed an 
ordinance authorizing, and it was in the process of implementing, a Business Activity Fee 
applying to non-Indian persons and companies doing business on Tribal trust land. Under 
the approved ordinance affected persons and companies would have been required to 
obtain a license and pay a fee in the amount of 6% of the gross receipts from their business 
activity. 
Potentially affected individuals and companies were very concerned about the 
likely impact of the proposed Business Activity Fee, and the State felt that it might 
significantly impact business activity in the area. Because of these concerns the State 
entered into negotiations with the Tribe seeking to avoid imposition of the Business 
Activity Fee. 
The result of the negotiations was an agreement to jointly support legislation which 
would divert a portion of severance taxes collected by the State from oil and gas 
production on Tribal trust lands to a fund dedicated to supporting revitalization projects on 
the reservation and in the surrounding area. The legislation passed in 1995, the fund was 
established, and it has been operating as intended since that time. As indicated above, the 
creation of the fund was a specific trade-off for an agreement on the part of the Ute Indian 
Tribe not to impose its Business Activity Fee. Section 9-10-108(1) provides specifically 
that the diversion of State severance tax income into the fund is dependent upon "no 
business or activity fee or tax based upon gross receipts [being] imposed by a county or the 
Tribe." 
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Following passage of the legislation establishing the Uintah Basin Revitalization 
Fund, negotiations were conducted with the Navajo Nation with respect to the possibility 
of establishing a similar fiind through the diversion of a portion of severance taxes 
collected by the State from oil and gas production on Navajo trust land. Here again, the 
negotiations were conducted in the broad context of government-to-government relations 
between the State and the Navajo Nation, with a variety of other issues being discussed at 
the same time. Agreement was reached on the establishment of a Hind patterned after the 
one operating in the Uintah Basin. The willingness of the State to agree to a diversion of 
severance taxes was in return for concessions made by the Navajo Nation on other issues 
and was in line with the general policy of the State to be even-handed in its dealings with 
Indian tribes. 
In 1996 legislation was passed creating the Navajo Revitalization Fund to support 
revitalization projects on the Utah portion of the Navajo Reservation. Section 9-11-101 et 
seq. The fund has been operating as intended since that time. 
Nature of the Funds and Projects Financed Thereby 
The two revitalization funds operate similarly, under the direction of separate 
boards composed of representatives of the State, the Indian tribe and the county(ies) 
involved. The two boards have the authority to direct the disbursement of amounts in the 
funds to projects meeting the established criteria in the form of grants or loans. Sections 
9-10-i04(i)(a) and 9-1 l-106(l)(a). Attached as an Addendum to Amici's 2003 brief was 
a list of the amounts received and expended by the two funds over the years that they had 
been operating and some details on the projects financed. In many cases the amounts from 
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the revitalization funds have been matched with monies from governmental, tribal or other 
sources to finance projects too large to be financed by a single funding source. 
The amounts received by the two funds have generally been expended as they have 
been received and any remaining, unexpended balances have been committed to approved 
projects which are either in the planning stages or under construction. 
In the ExxonMobil case, Amici explained the anticipated impact should the Court 
decide to change the interpretation of the statute and apply a new interpretation 
retroactively. The impacts enunciated by Amici in 2003, were: 
1. The inability of the Amici Funds to refund the expended or committed 
severance taxes that they had received in connection with a refund ordered as part of a 
decision changing the interpretation of the severance tax statute and giving the decision 
retroactive application. 
2. The adverse political consequences a decision reducing tax collections 
would have by changing the basis on which severance taxes are calculated thereby 
reducing the amount going into the two funds and consequently the amount available to 
finance projects on the two Indian reservations. The establishment of the two Amici 
Revitalization Funds and the expectation that they would receive a certain level of funding 
from the diversion of severance taxes pursuant to the statutory formula was part of 
negotiated settlements between the State of Utah, the Ute Indian Tribe, the Navajo Nation 
and three Utah counties. To change the formula on which the negotiation calculations 
were premised could result in: 
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a. The Indian people considering this as another example of having been given 
promises which were not fill filled; 
b. The Utes proceeding to implement their proposed, economically damaging 
Business Activity Fee; and, 
c. The Navajos taking the position that they are no longer bound by negotiated 
concessions that they made. 
There remains a very real potential that above-noted consequences could be 
realized in the future should the revenues derived by the Amici Funds be insufficient to 
finance the necessary programs and projects anticipated by the Indian people during their 
negotiations with the State. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The anticipated impacts indicated by Amici in the 2003 case before this Court were 
not imaginary nor were they inflated or exaggerated. The 2003 representation by Amici of 
the impact to the Amici Funds had the Court applied a changed interpretation of the statute 
retroactively was valid and correct at the time it was made. A decision by the Court 
accepting the view of the interpretation of the key statute urged by the Appellant therein 
and the Petitioner herein, would have an impact upon the finances of the State and, if the 
decision had been applied retroactively, potentially a catastrophic impact upon the two 
Funds filing their brief as Amici in 2003, and herein. Severance taxes collected by the 
State constitute an important component of the revenue relied upon by the State and 100% 
of the revenue of Amici, two funds established to finance deserving projects on or close to 
the Ute and Navajo Indian Reservations. 
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A decision changing the interpretation of the statute retroactively would have given 
all oil companies a basis for seeking refunds of previously paid taxes. The Amici Funds 
would not have been capable of refunding taxes received and spent or committed as part of 
their ongoing, beneficial work. It was essential that any change in the interpretation of the 
statute be limited to prospective application to avoid the creation of an impossible 
situation. 
The well-established common law of this State provides a solid basis for limiting 
any such decision to prospective application and this Court was correct to limit it's holding 
to a prospective application. 
ARGUMENT 
L THIS COURT SHOULD NOT OVERTURN THE PROSPECTIVE RELIEF 
LIMITATION ADOPTED IN EXXONMOBIL. 
Over a period of thirty years this Court has consistently approved giving only 
prospective effect to decisions invalidating or changing the interpretation of a statute 
where parties would be adversely affected by making the decision retroactive. Van Dyke 
v. Chappell 818 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1991); Timpanogos Planning and Water Mgmt. Agency 
v. Central Utah Water Conservancy Dist, 690 P.2d 562 (Utah 1984); Board of Educ. of 
the Granite Sch. Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030 (Utah 1983); Loval Order of 
Moose, #259 v. County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 657 P.2d 257 (Utah 
1982); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 493 P.2d 1002 (Utah 1972). 
In the case of Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984), this 
Court first used the approach of "selective prospectivity" where the decision is applied to 
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the parties before the court but not to other parties whose claims or defenses arose prior to 
the decision changing the law. In Rio Algom the Court invalidated a property tax statute 
on constitutional grounds. The decision was applied retroactively to the six plaintiffs in 
the case and prospectively as to all other taxpayers. Such an approach was held to violate 
no right under the United States Constitution and to be justified by any of the following 
circumstances: 
1. To avoid imposing a financial or administrative burden on local units of 
government, Id. at 195; 
2. To preserve the financial solvency of local government units, Id. at 196; or 
3. Where there has been reliance. Id. 
The 1991 U.S. Supreme Court case of James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia. 
501 U.S. 529 (1991) (superseded by statute on other grounds), recognized that equitable 
considerations may be taken into account in deciding whether to apply decisions 
retroactively. These equitable considerations include whether there has been substantial 
reliance on the prior state of the law, whether persons other than the litigants might receive 
a windfall, and whether, in tax cases, a state might be heavily penalized by having to make 
reftmds as a result of the retroactive application of a decision. 
Beam left the door open for states to limit the availability of refunds in tax cases 
and two years after Beam this Court issued Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 862 
P.2d 1348 (Utah 1993), in which a taxpayer sought a refund of property taxes paid under 
protest based upon the Rio Algom invalidation of the statute under which they were 
collected. This Court denied the claim for a refund, holding specifically that the Rio 
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Algom decision barred all claims which arose prior to the decision's operable date. 
Kennecott Corp., 862 P.2d at 1350. The taxpayer argued that the Beam decision of the 
United States Supreme Court precluded the use of "selective prospectivity" in tax cases. 
Id. at 1351. This Court carefully analyzed the Beam decision and concluded that it left to 
the states the question of whether to apply law-changing decisions retroactively or 
prospectively. Id It then proceeded to reaffirm its prior determination that, in cases 
where there has been reliance upon the presumed validity of prior law and the retroactive 
application of a decision would impose a burden, the Court may order that a decision apply 
only prospectively. Id at 1352. Kennecott is important because in it this Court had an 
opportunity, in light of Beam, to depart from its time-honored willingness to limit 
decisions to prospective application if the circumstances of the case suggest that doing so 
would be the fairest way of proceeding. It declined to do so and again upheld the use of 
selective prospectivity. 
The pre ExxonMobil decision of this Court dealing with the question of how to 
apply decisions overruling prior authority was the 1999 case of Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
Property Tax Div. of the Utah State Tax Common, 979 P.2d 346 (Utah 1999). In that case 
the Court overturned a rule of the Tax Commission dealing with the apportionment of 
taxes assessed against the property of commercial airlines. The Court concluded its 
decision with the following ruling: 
Because retroactive application of our holding in this particular 
case could potentially create substantial disruption and chaos 
relating to tax revenues already collected and disbursed, our 
ruling shall be prospective only from the date it issues. 
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WL at 357 (citing c.f., Boards of Educ. v. Salt Lake County Common, 749 P.2d 1264, 1267-
68 (Utah 1988)). 
IL THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE SUPPORT THE COURT'S 
PRIOR DECISION TO APPLY IT'S HOLDING IN EXXONMOBIL IN A 
SELECTIVELY PROSPECTIVE MANNER. 
A. The Policy Considerations Recognized By This Court in 
ExxonMobil Were Valid and the Conclusion that 
Prospective Relief was Warranted was not Reversible 
Error. 
The practical question existed in 2003, and still exists in 2009, of whether the 
Court's decision regarding the interpretation of the statute, if applied without the 
prospective limitation, would open the door to claims by taxpayers for a refund of taxes 
collected prior to its decision. The concerns Amici presented in their brief and argument 
before the Court in the prior ExxonMobil matter were not exaggerated but were real and 
based upon the known facts at the time; refund requests had been filed which ranged from 
50% to 100% of the taxes that had been paid. Reductions of monies collected in this 
magnitude would have, and still will have, the potential to negatively impact the 
commitments made by the Amici Funds for ongoing projects. 
Opening that door in 2003, or in 2009, could arguably: (1) provide an unexpected 
windfall for oil and gas producers; (2) result in a very troublesome revenue drain to the 
State at a time of strained budgets and finances; and (3) create an impossible situation for 
the Amici, since severance tax revenue distributed to them has been expended and is not 
available to be refunded. 
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A number of considerations have been listed by this Court in its decisions over the 
years that are to be weighed in deciding whether to limit a decision to prospective 
application. All of the considerations were satisfied by the facts in ExxonMobil. Those 
considerations and the attendant facts presented to this Court in ExxonMobil were; 
lL Have commitments been made and government planning been conducted in 
reliance on the prior state of the law?; 2. What have been the expectations of 
the parties?; 3. Would anyone be harmed by a retroactive decision? 
As noted in Amici's Statement of Facts in 2003 as well as herein, in their 
negotiations with the Ute and Navajo Tribes which led up to the establishment of the two 
Funds filing this brief as Amici, State officials assumed that severance tax collections 
would remain at or close to past levels and relied on the fact that a certain amount of 
money would be diverted into the two Funds and be available to support significant 
projects on or close to the two Indian reservations. A change in the interpretation of the 
applicable statute causing the reduction of severance tax collections would disappoint 
everyone's expectations and undercut the commitments made. Having to refund severance 
taxes by reason of a retroactive decision would create an impossible situation since past 
severance taxes received by the Funds have been expended or committed. Having to 
renege on commitments made would seriously damage relations between the State and its 
two largest Indian tribes. 
4. Would a retroactive decision place a burden on the administration of justice? 
A retroactive decision changing the point at which oil and gas production is valued 
for severance tax purposes had, and has, the potential of opening the door to refund 
claims by dozens of oil and gas producers in the state responsible for the payment of 
l i 
severance taxes. In addition to ExxonMobil, the Appellant in the ExxonMobil case and a 
Petitioner herein, two Amici in that case, Conoco Phillips and Chevron Texaco indicated 
their interest in the issues involved in the case. There were and are many other potential 
refund claimants, large and small, waiting in the wings. Thus the orderly administration of 
justice would be clearly be burdened by changing the settled expectations of all parties by 
making the decision suddenly retroactive after having applied it prospectively for almost 
five years. 
5. Would time be needed by organizations affected by a new interpretation of 
the statute to make needed changes?; and, 6.Might a change in the 
interpretation of the statute resulting in refund claims negatively affect 
budgets and the solvency of governmental entities? 
The methodology of calculating severance taxes urged by the Appellant/Petitioner 
in 2003 would arguably have reduced the taxes paid to the State and thus, by the statutory 
calculation provision (Utah Code Ann. §§59-5-116 and 59-5-119), the amount received by 
the two Amici filing this brief The Court may not have wholesale adopted the 
Appellant's methodology, but any change in the calculation of severance taxes has the 
potential effect of reducing the taxes paid to the State and by extension, the amount 
received by the Amici funds. 
State budgets are based upon revenue estimates and are required to be balanced. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-38-2(8) (1997). Any reduction in severance tax collections, and 
particularly the need to refund taxes collected in the past, has the potential of affecting the 
State budget by destroying its balance. Such a reduction could be adjusted for 
prospectively but making it retroactive would cause havoc. 
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In addition to the overall effect on the State budget, the potential reduction in the 
income of the Amici Funds could result in the reopening of negotiations with the two 
Indian tribes involved and the entering into of new agreements. A requirement that funds 
be disgorged to satisfy severance tax refund claims would create an impossible situation 
and disturb expectations resulting from the past approval of projects for funding. Clearly 
time would be needed to adapt to any such prospective change and avoid catastrophic 
I 
budget and solvency problems. 
I 
I I 
Petitioner asserts, on page 28 of its brief, that this Court "ignored the fact that the 
only time the amici fiinds would be impacted was when the wells were actually located on 
Indian lands". Amici explained in their 2003 brief, and again in this brief on page 2, that 
"a portion of the severance taxes collected by the State from oil and gas production on 
Tribal trust lands" [emphasis added], was the negotiated source of revenue for the Funds 
which were established to support revitalization projects. 
Additionally, on page 28 of its brief Petitioner asserts that the Court's policy 
considerations which led to its decision to apply the prospective relief limitation "was 
based on the misapprehension of certain facts" and that the application of the Court's 
"decision would not have impacted 'other small governmental entities' because, with the 
exception of the severance taxes allocated to the amici funds, all of the remaining taxes are 
remitted to the State's General Fund". Further on page 44 of its brief Petitioner asserts 
that the Court's concern for "other relatively small governmental entities was misplaced" 
stating categorically, "thus there were no other small governmental entities which could 
I i 
have been negatively impacted by the Court's decision". As demonstrated below these 
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two statements are not accurate. There is a small governmental entity whose funding, 
which comes from a restricted account in the General Fund, would be negatively impacted. 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-14 states: 
(1) (a) There is levied a fee as provided in subsection (l)(b) for oil and 
gas: 
(i) produced; and 
(ii) (A) saved; 
(B) sold; or 
(C) transported from the field in Utah where the oil and gas is produced, 
(b) the fee imposed under subsection (1) is equal to the product of: 
(i) .002; and 
(ii) the value of the oil or gas determined in accordance with § 
59-5-103.1. 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-14.5 states: 
(1) There is created within the General Fund a restricted account known 
as the Oil and Gas Conservation Account. 
(2) The contents of the account shall consist of: 
(a) Revenues from the fee levied under section 40-6-14, including any 
penalties or interest charged for delinquent payments; and 
(b) interest and earnings on account monies. 
(3) Account monies shall be used to pay for the: 
(a) administration of this chapter; and 
(b) plugging and reclamation of abandoned oil wells or bore, core, or 
exploratory holes for which: 
(i) there is no reclamation surety; or 
(ii) the forfeited surety is insufficient for plugging and reclamation... . 
Therefore, the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining depends on the fee created in 40-
6-14 and the oil and gas conservation account created in 40-6-14.5 for the "administration 
of this chapter." 'This chapter" is 40-6 the Board and Division of Oil, Gas and Mining. 
Section 40-6-4 creates the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining and provides for the payment of 
their expenses in administering chapter 6 through the fee created in 40-6-14. That fee is 
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specifically tied to valuation as determined under § 59-5-103.1. That statute was central to 
the valuation question in ExxonMobil. The determination of valuation under § 59-5-103.1 
would directly impact the conservation fee created under Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-14 and 
the ability of the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining to pay its expenses for the 
administration of that chapter. 
Therefore, the statement that there were no "other small governmental entities that 
i 
could be impacted by the decision" is simply not true. To represent that the Court was 
I I 
"misinformed" regarding the existence and the funding source for the Funds is also not 
accurate. 
Petitioner's argument that the case of Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91, 
requires the Court to reverse it's prior decision as reversible error is without foundation. 
Petitioner appears to argue that because Amici was the first to raise the ability of the Court 
to limit it's holding to a prospective application, the Court "did not have the benefit from 
the focus and refinement afforded issues actually litigated in the lower courts". But the 
I i 
i 
issues which required the focus and refinement were actually litigated in the lower courts, 
those issues being how to calculate the severance taxes assessed on oil and gas 
exploration. 
Amici simply reminded the Court of the precedential line of cases, some relating 
specifically to taxing disputes, wherein the Court had applied it's ultimate ruling in a 
limited manner due to the equities of the situation. Amici presented accounting 
information to the Court identifying the revenue received by the funds and how that 
i 
revenue had been expended or committed to illustrate Amici's concern that a decision 
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requiring the Funds to refiind the money received from the severance taxes could create 
significant hardship, if not an fiscal impossibility on the Funds. There was no 
misstatement of facts nor any intentional exaggeration of solvency concerns as asserted by 
Petitioner in footnote 18 on page 43 of its brief The accounting illustrated for the Court 
the revenue that had been received by the Funds and how that revenue had been allocated 
by the Funds. 
The facts were the facts and the law was the law. Amici didn't assert a novel 
theory of law, the law of prospective limitation already existed and had been fully vetted 
and applied by this Court for a number of years prior to ExxonMobil. Because neither 
Appellant/Petitioner, the Tax Commission, nor other Amici oil and gas companies raised 
the ability to apply a decision prospectively does not mean that the Court should have 
ignored Amici's argument that prospective application of its decision was appropriate. 
B, Facts subsequent to the Court's decision in EXXONMOBIL 
are irrelevant in determining the correctness of the Court's 
prior decision. 
Petitioner asserts that facts subsequent to the Court's prior ruling clearly indicate 
that the Court's ruling was in error. However, that position by Petitioner begs the 
question. It is impossible to know what the subsequent facts would have been had the 
Court decided to apply it's decision retroactively. Was it the Court's decision that created 
the facts subsequent to it's decision or would those same subsequent facts exist without 
that decision? 
Had the Court not ruled to apply it's decision in a selectively prospective manner 
the subsequent facts and events could have been very different. The other oil and gas 
16 
Amici which had filed for refunds may have pursued those refunds. Other oil and gas 
producers who did not file because of the Court's ruling on prospective application may 
have filed refund claims. Had the ruling been retroactive and had all refund claims been 
pursued, the impact of just such a course of events was exactly what was postured by 
Amici in 2003. That concern was one of the policy considerations reasonably relied on by 
the Couit. 
The Court, based on its own precedents, weighed the equities and reasonable 
policy considerations presented and, based on the facts existing at the time, concluded that 
its decision should be applied prospectively. One thing is clear, that all interested parties, 
Petitioners, other oil and gas producers, the Oil and Gas Conservation Fund, Amici Funds, 
the Tax Commission and the State of Utah have relied on the Court's prior decision. 
Petitioners have failed to show that decision by the Court was clearly erroneous. 
Therefore the Court should decline to upset all parties settled expectations by reversing its 
prior holding. 
CONCLUSION 
The Amici Funds respectfully requests that the Court sustain the Funds' reliance 
upon the Court's prior decision. Since the issuance of the ExxonMobil decision in 
l 
November 2004 the Revitalization Funds have relied upon the Court's holding that its 
decision in that instance "would apply prospectively only." In reliance on that decision the 
Funds have continued to plan and commit for expenditures based upon the revenue stream 
projected. The Amici Funds have relied upon the Court's statement in making 
I i 
commitments and upon the expectation that projected revenue streams would not be 
17 
adversely impacted by refund requests made in reliance on the prior decision. That settled 
reliance should not be upset by the Courts now reversing its own decision. 
Dated th i sS j^day of July, 2009. 
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